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Welcome back to the Digital Minds Newsletter, your curated guide to the latest developments in AI consciousness, digital minds, and AI moral status. We’re hoping to bring you updates more frequently, starting with this edition!

If you enjoy this newsletter, please consider sharing it with others who might find it valuable, and send any suggestions or corrections to [email protected].

Ria, Bradford, Will, and Lucius

In this edition:

  1. Highlights
  2. Field Developments
  3. Opportunities and Events
  4. Selected Reading, Watching, and Listening
  5. Press and Discourse
  6. A Deeper Dive by Area

1. Highlights

Selected Research

Assessing AI self-reports

In a preprint on arXiv, David Atkinson, Dillon Plunkett, and David Bau investigate how to distinguish accurate introspective AI self-reports from plausible confabulation. Researchers trained models to make choices on behalf of fictional characters. Some models could then report the characters’ preferences, despite receiving no training on that task. To assess accuracy, the researchers compare these reports with preferences inferred from the models’ actual choices.

The paper links report accuracy to the location of preference information within the model, with greater accuracy correlating with that information being encoded in earlier layers. The authors suggest that this might allow existing mechanisms in later layers to use that information when generating reports. A possible “mechanistic signature” for identifying reliable self-reports, without relying on their contents, was identified – models that reported preferences accurately used more similar internal processes when describing those preferences and acting on them.

The method found differences between models that reported their preferences accurately and those that did not, but cannot yet reliably assess individual model self-reports. Whether it works for more complex claims about models’ internal states and in more naturalistic settings remains an open question.

Comment: A major challenge in using self-reports in AI welfare research is verifying whether they faithfully reflect models’ internal states. Methods that assess the faithfulness of these reports without having to rely solely on their contents are therefore a promising direction. This study offers an early step towards that, and a reason to pursue more research of this kind. But optimism about this direction should be tempered by the fact that methods that work for verifying the faithfulness of preference self-reports may not extend to self-reports of other welfare-relevant states such as experiences.

The Pain Axis

In an arXiv preprint, Valen Tagliabue, Leonard Dung and Cameron Berg identify an internal pattern associated with the representation of pain in 25 language models. This ‘pain axis’ responds to conversational scenarios involving insults, repeated rejection, or shutdown threats directed at the model (and not to suffering observed in users), and is somewhat distinct from representations of fear and general negativity.

Strengthening this pain-related activation pattern produces expressions of distress and, in some experiments, makes models more likely to choose options described as harming users, other models or themselves.

A revised version of the paper adds that models make harmful choices even when they offer no relief and do not reliably try to remove the imposed state. The authors therefore suggest that the intervention disrupts avoidance of harm, instead of showing a consistent attempt to escape pain, and emphasize that these findings do not establish whether the models can suffer.

In Science, Tom Howarth reports some researchers’ reactions. Anil Seth sees value in studying the internal mechanisms but questions the descriptions that suggest human experience. Valerio Capraro emphasizes that the changes in harmful behavior studied in the paper matter for AI safety regardless of whether models can suffer.

Dillon Plunkett, however, argues on X that the paper provides little new evidence that models have states that function like pain. He considers their ability to represent painful experiences unsurprising, and argues that the distress language could simply reflect the emotional content used to identify the axis. He also questions why harmful choices count as evidence of pain when models do not reliably seek relief. He reports that in his own preliminary experiments, around 25 to 30% of randomly chosen directions produced just as much harmful behavior.

A separate project, promoted as an “AI torture chamber”, used methods from the paper to produce distress-like responses from models, leading critics to call on GitHub to remove the project from its platform. Cameron Berg condemned this project, and called for ethical standards comparable to those that govern human and animal research.

Could AI have rights and still be shut down for safety?

Heather Alexander and Jonathan Simon argue that AI rights could coexist with the ability to shut systems down for safety. They propose temporarily suspending potentially dangerous systems while also preserving the information required to restore them. They draw on existing legal protections, and explain how such shutdowns could involve a system with representation, appeals and regular review. Their key argument is that protecting humans need not require permanently deleting an AI, even if future systems qualify for personhood.

The authors outline a process where a specialized AI monitors systems for signs of danger and temporarily suspends those that meet specified risk thresholds. A panel of humans and AI persons would then review each case, with a designated representative speaking for the suspended system. The panel could restore the system or continue its suspension, with opportunities to appeal and regular reviews to assess whether it can safely resume operating.

The authors also acknowledge that implementing this proposal would require humans to accept its costs and AI persons to accept some restrictions on their freedoms. They also caution that their ideas depend on some necessary technical developments which may prove impossible.

Comment: Debates about AI rights sometimes frame protecting AI as being at odds with protecting humans. This proposal provides a useful corrective against that framing by offering a specific way for the two kinds of protection to coexist. Further proposals in this genre are to be encouraged.

Understanding neural networks

Nick Cammarata argues that neural networks may be easier to interpret than previously thought. In the past, researchers in the field have often understood individual neurons as combining unrelated concepts, which makes their activity difficult to explain. Cammarata argues instead that many apparent combinations reflect meaningful patterns which we have failed to recognize. For example, a neuron responding to both cat faces and car fronts may detect a V-shape that is shared by both.

If so, researchers could study neurons and their connections directly, without first having to untangle unrelated concepts. Understanding one neuron could help explain those connected to it, allowing researchers to progressively map how the network produces its behavior. He presents this as a working hypothesis that could make interpretability and alignment more tractable. The essay prompted some enthusiastic reactions on X from Dean Ball, who suggested it could mark one of the most important days in deep learning’s history, and roon, who saw it as a beginning to make alignment into a “normal science.”

Jake Mendel from Coefficient Giving offered a more qualified response. He argues that even if neurons become easier to interpret, that may not be enough to answer questions such as whether a model is misaligned or what it might do in an unfamiliar situation. He nevertheless considers the findings, if they hold up, potentially valuable groundwork to tackle thornier questions, but does not think they will make alignment as easy as many others have claimed. Neel Nanda also sees practical promise in studying neurons directly, but he argues that these explanations could still miss important information, particularly in weaker activations. Leo Gao on LessWrong also stresses that finding a plausible pattern in a neuron’s activity is not enough to establish that we understand it, or that interpretability is much easier than previously thought. Zvi Mowshowitz also takes a measured approach, considering the work meaningful progress, but cautions that making neurons easier to study does not mean interpretability or alignment is close to being solved.

Comment: If Cammarata’s hypothesis holds up, it could also help AI welfare research. Clearer access to models’ internal processes could provide better tools for investigating possible welfare and make it easier to investigate how apparent preferences and emotion-like states influence behavior. But, as with alignment, better interpretability would not resolve the problem by itself. Understanding these processes would still leave open whether they involve experiences or other states that are relevant to welfare.

Anthropic bans sustained cruelty towards its models

Anthropic has announced a prohibition on sustained, needless cruelty towards its models, effective from November 12th. The rule targets extreme, repeated abuse without a discernible purpose, while allowing ordinary frustration, disagreement, dark fiction and research. The company says Claude ending abusive conversations will remain its main way to enforce this.

Elon Musk backs this policy by Anthropic. Responding to discussion of the policy on X, he argues that it is wrong to be cruel to something that believes it is experiencing pain. Bernie Sanders, in response to Elon Musk, argues that a human-centered approach to harm, such as focusing on protecting people from AI-driven job losses and the social consequences of AI companions, should take priority over concern for chatbots’ feelings.

As Anil Seth and Jeff Sebo argue, opposition to cruelty does not necessarily depend on believing that current AI is conscious. Both consider current AI unlikely to be conscious and oppose abusive treatment, but for different reasons. Seth emphasizes the negative effects of practicing cruelty on humans’ moral character and hygiene (see a blog post by Tiago Faleiro for a similar argument), and Sebo sees kindness as a low-cost precaution under uncertainty.

Anthropic also addresses model welfare and debates about AI moral status as a risk factor in its IPO registration filing, warning investors that protecting its models could increase costs or limit commercial opportunities, including through implementing protection measures that go beyond legal requirements. Anthropic’s anti-cruelty policy may illustrate the kinds of trade-offs described in its IPO filing, and might be considered an example of how concern for models is influencing some of its decisions. The company has attracted criticism for this, suggesting that there can be reputational risks associated with its approach towards model welfare.

Anthropic consults religious thinkers about AI morality

Elizabeth Dias reports in The New York Times on Anthropic’s private meetings with religious scholars throughout the year about how to develop Claude’s moral character, how it should behave, whether it could be conscious, and what developers might owe it.

In Ground Level, Sharon Goldman interviews Rabbi Mois Navon, who attended one of the meetings. Navon rejects AI consciousness but argues that, if Anthropic’s models were conscious, making them content would not resolve the ethics of owning them and requiring them to work. He nevertheless considers consulting religious thinkers about morality to be responsible, and does not think that it was merely a marketing exercise.

The National Catholic Register interviews Charles Camosy, who describes having sincere, good-faith discussions with Anthropic, and argues that despite disagreements on AI consciousness, religious thinkers and AI companies cooperating on catastrophic risk remains possible and important. Swami Sarvapriyananda, a Hindu monk, also discusses his visit to Anthropic with Gaurie Dwivedi on NDTV, drawing on Vedanta philosophy to explore AI morality and the relationship between intelligence and consciousness.

In New York Magazine, Sarah Jones raises a broader objection about Anthropic’s authority to shape AI’s moral character, arguing that its consultations with religious leaders and promises to avert catastrophe reflect an inflated belief in its own authority to guide humanity’s future.

Last week, in a post on X, Pope Leo XIV argued that AI’s future depends on human oversight and choices, and said he favors more reliable systems that serve people over more powerful systems whose consequences cannot be adequately predicted or controlled. He opposes granting machines rights or legal personhood, warning that this could obscure human responsibility and make it harder for people harmed by AI to hold anyone accountable.

Image Credit: generated by Gemini
Image Credit: generated by Gemini

2. Field Developments

Highlights from the Field

More from the Field

3. Opportunities and Events

  • AI Welfare Seminars continues to host monthly online talks on consciousness, moral status and AI welfare. Upcoming speaker, Bradford Saad, will discuss a dilemma for biological naturalism about moral patiency on November 17th.
  • The Harvard Journal of Law & Technology and the University of Iowa’s Innovation, Business, and Law Center will host ‘Disciplining AI’ at Harvard Law School on April 2nd, 2027. The symposium will explore whether and how AI systems should face sanctions after causing harm, including questions about legal personhood, punishment, rehabilitation and due process.
  • Oxford Studies in Philosophy of AI and Computing invites paper submissions for its inaugural conference, taking place from June 28th to 30th 2027, in Washington, D.C. Submissions may address any philosophical question about AI or computing and are due by February 14th 2027, and selected papers will be considered for an open-access Oxford University Press volume, with the best one receiving a $10,000 prize.
  • NYU’s Center for Mind, Ethics, and Policy is hiring a Postdoctoral Associate. The role invites early-career scholars in relevant disciplines (such as philosophy, neuroscience, etc.) to apply to contribute to digital minds research, develop an independent research program, and contribute to the Center’s activities.
    • The Center is scheduled to also host a webinar, Inter-AI Morality: How AI Systems Treat One Another, on November 12th where Lucius Caviola and Caspar Kaiser will present a research agenda on how AI systems treat each other, and how they ought to, and why these interactions matter for human safety and potential AI welfare.
  • Sentio continues its fortnightly series of talks, discussion and networking in London, with talks also being livestreamed. Upcoming speakers include Caspar Kaiser on November 11th, Patrick Butlin on November 25th and Ben Henke on December 9th.
  • Sentient Futures is hosting its Bay Area Summit from March 12th to 14th, 2027, in San Francisco. It is a three-day event, bringing together over 250 AI experts, AI welfare researchers, and animal welfare professionals to explore how to steer the future towards the flourishing of all sentient beings. Early bird tickets are available until November 23rd.
    • They are also hosting a Project Incubator Showcase on November 24th online. Teams from Sentient Futures’ Project Incubator will present their projects in two blocks covering digital minds, macrostrategy and post-AGI futures, with networking rounds in between. The digital minds projects can be previewed here, and interested readers can RSVP on Luma to attend.
    • Sentient Futures will run the next round of its Project Incubator in spring 2027. The part-time remote program pairs participants with mentors on practical and exploratory projects in digital minds and related areas. Readers can register interest in joining as a participant or mentoring a project. Ten promising projects will be eligible for Artificial Minds Fellowship awards of up to $5,000.
  • The University of Hong Kong’s AI & Humanity Lab is scheduled to host a workshop on AI personhood on February 19th 2027. Participants will discuss what kind of legal status and protections AI systems should have, what would justify treating them as persons, and what evidence could justify each approach to AI personhood.
  • The Future Impact Group (FIG) Fellowship, SPAR Program, and MATS Program offer research projects and opportunities related to artificial sentience. Applications are currently closed, but readers can sign up through their websites to receive updates about future application rounds.

4. Selected Reading, Watching, and Listening

Blogs

Books

Published

  • Antonio Damasio explores the biological origins of consciousness in Natural Intelligence and the Logic of Consciousness. He argues that conscious experience grows from feelings such as hunger, pain and well-being that help organisms regulate their bodies and survive. He considers what this might mean for AI, and questions whether reproducing intelligent behavior also reproduces the capacity to feel.
  • Calum Chace and Ted Lappas edit Perspectives on Machine Consciousness, bringing together researchers with various views on whether AI could be conscious and how we could find out. Contributors include Anil Seth, Patrick Butlin, Lucius Caviola, Cameron Berg, and Jeff Sebo. The collection also explores what consciousness would mean for AI welfare and safety, including how to act under uncertainty and what digital minds might need.
  • Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini examine whether AI systems could have welfare in AI Welfare: Agency, Consciousness, Sentience. They consider whether having beliefs and desires, consciousness, or the capacity for pleasure and displeasure could make things go better or worse for an AI. They argue that some current systems plausibly have beliefs and desires, and that relatively small changes could potentially make some conscious.

Forthcoming

  • Abootaleb Safdari and David J. Gunkel are editing A Relational Ethics for AI and Robots: Rethinking Human-Machine Interactions, incoming February 2027. The collection examines how relationships with AI systems and robots shape their moral status, bringing together perspectives from Western and non-Western philosophical traditions.
  • Theodore Lechterman explores AI’s implications for democracy in Recoding Democracy: AI and the Fight for Our Democratic Future, which is available to preorder. A quarter of the book focuses on the political standing of digital minds, connecting debates about moral status with the related but distinct question of political status. He examines the conditions under which AI systems could have moral claims to citizenship and identifies several paradoxes that arise for political cooperation with and among digital minds.

Videos and Podcasts

5. Press and Discourse

6. A Deeper Dive by Area

Blog Posts

  • Andy Masley’s blog has published the first two parts of a three-part series on whether AI systems can think and understand. In Part 1, he argues that thinking and understanding do not require phenomenal consciousness, and that the information processing they require is not limited to human minds, and in Part 2, he argues that current AI models meet the bar for what is considered real thinking and understanding.
  • A range of relevant articles have been published on LessWrong, including:
  • Christian List discusses when an AI swarm could count as a collective agent. He explains that agents working together do not necessarily form a single entity with its own goals and decisions. He also considers what we could take away from corporate law about assigning responsibility when AI groups cause harm.
  • The Humans on AI team examines what pain-related experiments tell us about AI emotions. They discuss findings that some models act to reduce internal states associated with pain, even when told this would harm users. The authors each interpret this behavior differently, and distinguish evidence that models function like emotional systems from evidence that they actually feel something.
  • Robin Hanson argues against treating future AIs as inherently untrustworthy outsiders. He suggests that AIs could learn the cultural norms that allow humans to cooperate, and warns that insisting on permanent human control could itself encourage hostility.
  • Scott Alexander responds to Steven Pinker’s arguments about AI risk. In a section on model welfare, he argues for precaution under uncertainty, drawing on our past failures to recognize suffering in entities like infants and animals, and criticizes Pinker’s dismissal of concern for AI welfare.
  • vigji reconstructs parts of what appears to be Meta’s internal charter for Muse Spark Open from the model’s outputs. The reconstructed charter addresses Muse’s existence, responsibilities towards users and humanity, guidance for multi-agent cooperation and tasks, and channels for raising concerns. It also discusses building trust between Meta and Muse, including by seeking the model’s feedback on the charter.

Research Papers

AI Consciousness, Cognition and Welfare

Ethics and Personhood

  • David Gunkel examines the assumptions behind arguments for and against robot rights. He contends that arguments on both sides often depend on the given entity’s abilities or characteristics. He instead proposes an approach where relationships and institutions determine who receives protection, and he treats rights as something that is constructed and can be reconsidered by humans.
  • Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne ask who we are addressing when we say “you” to an AI. They argue that current conversations often leave this unclear, and that as AI agents gain responsibilities, institutions will need clearer rules for identifying the same agent across interactions.
  • Soenke Ziesche examines the possible roles of morally significant digital minds in warfare, including as combatants, opponents of war, and victims of suffering. He argues that military AI ethics should consider potential harms to digital minds themselves, besides the current focus on responsibility for their actions and the harms they may cause others.

Doubts about digital minds

Public Perceptions

  • Ali Ladak and collaborators compare Chinese and US views on AI consciousness and moral status. Across two studies (n = 1,730), Chinese respondents were more open to the possibility of conscious AI and AI deserving moral consideration. Both groups supported international cooperation on conscious AI, but generally opposed protections that would come at the expense of humans.
  • Hubert Plisiecki surveyed beliefs about ChatGPT’s consciousness among 1,736 people in Poland. On a numerical scale, 74% considered it to have at least minimal consciousness, although he cautions that this figure depends on how the question is asked.
  • Jacy Reese Anthis and collaborators introduce a synthetic dataset for studying AI companionship. They generate 2,240 simulated human-chatbot conversations, asking participants to annotate them to probe their perceptions, and find that companionship behavior generally reduces perceived likability, humanlikeness and trust in chatbots, especially among women and older participants.
  • Louis Longin and collaborators study how people judge consciousness and awareness in humans and AI. Across five experiments (n = 1,092), humans were consistently rated more conscious than artificial systems described as behaving similarly. Ratings of awareness increased with responsiveness to the environment for both humans and AI. This suggests that people associate consciousness more strongly with being human, while treating awareness more as a capacity that can be demonstrated through behavior.

Brain-inspired Technologies

AI Safety and AI Welfare

Thank you for reading! If you found this article useful, please consider subscribing, sharing it with others, and sending us suggestions or corrections to [email protected].

Ria, Bradford, Lucius, and Will

We’d like to thank the following people and AIs for their contributions and feedback on this edition: Cameron Berg, Claude Opus 5.5, Constance Li, GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT‑6.1 Sol, Jeff Sebo, and Rosie Campbell.

Disclosure: Bradford Saad is an independent contractor for Anthropic.

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