I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).
I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).
I can help with career advice, prioritisation, and quantitative analyses.
Hi Marcus. Nice post.
Corporate campaigns to reduce the suffering of farmed chickens have been estimated to spare hundreds of hens from cage confinement per dollar, which is plausibly orders of magnitude more cost-effective, in suffering averted, than even the best global health interventions, if you’re willing to give chickens some moral consideration.
I think funding current work on corporate campaigns targeting layers helps a few hens per $, around 1 % of the cost-effectiveness mentioned above. Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE) estimated The Humane League's (THL's) accountability work targeting layers in 2024 helped 11 hens per $. My intuition having worked for the last 11 months at Anima International is that our marginal cost-effectiveness is 30 % of the cost-effectiveness of our whole spending. Applying this multiplier to ACE's estimate, I get 3.30 hens helped per $ (= 0.3*11). Relatedly, @abrahamrowe guessed in January 2025 that corporate campaigns for chicken welfare not funded by Coefficient Giving (CG), including ones run by organisations funded by CG, were as cost-effective as burning money. I was surprised by Abraham's claim at the time, but I have meanwhile come closer to his position.
I think we know for sure the probability that people who've been convicted of crimes will reoffend is far greater than for people who have never committed a crime. We don't have to ask what if.
I agree people who have been convicted of crimes are much more likely to commit crimes than people who do not (although I wonder how much this varies with the type of crime). However, say the probability of a Austin's alternative hire commiting a financial crime was 0.01 %, and that this is 0.1 % for Caroline, 10 times as high. I just made up these probabilities. It is not obvious to me that 0.1 % is too high, and that therefore Caroline should not have been hired. Is your view that the probability of Caroline commiting a financial crime at Manifund is obviously too high? I expect hiring managers to generally be more informed about the people they hire than me because they have much more context.
Hi Jim. Great post.
One reason to doubt DiGiovanni's unawareness argument (specifically, his empirical premise) is that it is unclear where the line is between A) my understanding of a decision problem is fine-grained enough for me to trust my best guess, and B) it is too coarse-grained (and I must suspend judgment). While DiGiovanni does not object to this and recognizes some version of the problem, he suggests that the line must come before “promoting the impartial good”.
I do not think there is a fact of the matter about the location of the line separating A) and B). I would say it depends on the operationalisation of the claim under assessment, which should be falsifiable. Relatedly, I agree with Brian Tomasik that:
It doesn't make sense to ask questions like, Does a computer program of a mind really instantiate consciousness? That question reifies consciousness as a thing that may or may not be produced by a program. Rather, the particles constituting the computer just move—and that's it. The question of whether a given physical operation is "conscious" is not a factual dispute but a definitional one: Do we want to define consciousness as including those sorts of physical operations?
In the context of consciousness, I think the right move is i) considering all systems have more than exactly 0 moral value instead of ii) separating systems into ones that have exactly 0 moral weight, and ones that have more than exactly 0 moral weight. In the context of cluelessness, I believe the right move is i) considering the expected value (EV) of any 2 actions is comparable more or less robustly instead of ii) separating actions into ones whose EV is comparable, and ones whose EV is not comparable.
Hi Yarrow. Thanks sharing your thoughts.
As with Caroline Ellison, I don't think anyone is saying that someone who has done something morally egregious should not be able to get a job or should be excluded from society. But does Caroline Ellison need to continue working in a financial role?
Suppose the probability of Caroline committing illegal actions at Manifund is similar to that of typical hires for similar roles. Would you still oppose Austin hiring Caroline? If so, would you also oppose Austin hiring Caroline for any other role at Manifund? If so, why?
For large grants, I do them. I would be very happy to have your analysis help me here.
You are welcome to get in touch if any opportunities arise.
If you have grants or projects you are very interested in, let me know, and I will take them into consideration, especially if you have lots of analysis for them.
I will keep this in mind.
Hi Barbara. Welcome to posting on the EA Forum.
Take a school-plates initiative that shifts institutional meals toward plant-based defaults. On any single scale it may look middling. But its counterfactual case may be stronger than any one metric shows, because a fair accounting would convert those effects into a common currency rather than penalising the intervention for succeeding on more than one front.
I think funding i) some interventions that very cost-effectively decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (like those supported by the Climate Fund (CF)), and ii) some other interventions that very cost-effectively increase the welfare of farmed animals (like those supported by the Animal Welfare Fund (AWF)) is better than funding iii) interventions that decrease GHG emissions and increase the welfare of farmed animals, but do not achieve either very cost-effectively (like School Plates, I believe). I estimated School Plates in 2023 increased the welfare of farmed animals 19.4 % as cost-effectively as cage-free corporate campaigns helping hens.
Conversion, not addition, is the operation that matters here, and it is easy to get wrong: suffering-adjusted days, tonnes of CO2-equivalent, and disability-adjusted life years cannot be summed, because the units do not combine.
The benefits to farmed animals can be compared with the benefits to humans of decreasing GHG emissions. I think the benefits to farmed animals from replacing chicken meat with beef or pork are much larger than the harm this causes to humans due to increased GHG emissions.
My concern is a potential future in which AI effectively takes over the skilled labor niche, and this eliminates an important rung on the proverbial ladder low skilled workers have traditionally used to improve their social and economic status.
Fair.
Nobody likes being stuck in a dead end job, and the outcome the article proposes (at least, the more pessimistic parts of the forecast) sounds like the majority of the population effectively trapped in a pre-determined economic caste with little to no meritocratic means of escape.
I think pre-determined economic conditions are not necessarily bad. I guess people will be happy if they have a high income (considering all sources), even if they do not have a job. I assume this is mostly the case for people who have retired in high income countries.
Hello. Welcome to the EA Forum. I am not familiar with feudalism, but I think what matters is increasing welfare. You may be interested in the podcast episode Liberalism Forever.
Hello. Thanks. Assuming the stunners are subsidised has a small effect on the change in soil-arthropod-years per electrically stunned shrimp.
Here are the details.
I assume the stunners are not subsidised in the baseline scenario because I am expecting subsidised stunners to stun a minority of the shrimps electrically stunned in the future. @Aaron Boddy🔸, who was the CEO of the Shrimp Welfare Project (SWP) until July 2026, commented the following on 7 Octoner 2024.