This is a special post for quick takes by JoelMcGuire. Only they can create top-level comments. Comments here also appear on the Quick Takes page and All Posts page.
Things I've done some work on that I plan to publish more on that seem relevant to some EA conversations in global health and wellbeing :
Does each doubling have the same return to wellbeing? The convention (outside of time discounts) is to assume that going from $500 to $1000 is the same return on wellbeing as $500k to $1,000k. I think that's probably not true. This affects how we think about improving incomes in high versus low income countries.
How effective are cash transfers in high income countries? So far, it seems like cash transfers that improve annual income by 10-30% in the USA have pretty much no effect on wellbeing. Weird. Not sure why yet. Seems bearish for UBI, but I'm not quite sure what's a better idea yet.
Does economic growth make countries happier? Richer countries are happier, richer people are happier, and people getting richer are happier, but countries getting richer has reportedly been a more mixed blessing for people. I expect to find something like growth is probably good but less good than you would expect based on looking at country cross sections. However, it's possible there's some weird scale use stuff that'd make growth look growth look like a miracle for human wellbeing.
If not growth in incomes, then what? I'll look at what if any reliable predictors there are of increases to national wellbeing -- an area I feel like we know surprisingly little about. There's some work suggesting that increases to social capital and social spending are better predictors than economic growth. Something like social capital seems plausible but social spending seems likelier to be confounded by the requirement that you need to make money to spend money (on welfare systems). But there's some evidence that trust and social capital is increased in societies that experience high growth, so it's all a bit messy.
Some less relevant things I'll work on: what does the causal evidence say about social media and mental wellbeing? -- it's somewhat bad, probably. How happy were our ancestors? -- Either about as happy as we are or, or as happy as people are in Afghanistan -- Which is to say teetering on the cusp of having negative wellbeing on average. Not sure which yet. Is it the psychology, stupid? I'm also curious to understand the psychology of populism, and if a non-material lens gives us a better sense of how to predict and maybe prevent populist driven destablization to the institutions we'll need to preserve to have any chance at governing during these wacky next few decades.
This is awesome, I've been meaning to sort out my confusions around this topic and expect your review to be very helpful for this.
Preregistering my reactions to see how I change my mind later:
Does each doubling have the same return to wellbeing? Probably not, I expect η > 1. GiveWell's η = 1.59 seems to be James Snowden's best guess; he asked himself"How many people would I increase the consumption from $1,000/year to $2,000/year to be equally as good as increasing one person’s consumption from $500/year to $1,000/year?", intuitively answered "~1.5" and back-solved for η. Alexander Berger shared CG's reasoning on their η = 1, including that it seems to be suggested by LS data. RP gets η = 1.87 from back-solving the equation at the end of their review of GW's discount rate. SoGive rounded up some references suggesting η > 1. I liked these comments by Karthik Tadepalli and Michael Dickens on the topic
How effective are cash transfers in high income countries? Not sure, picture seems mixed. On the one hand there's stuff like this NBER paper on US cash transfers in the vein of what you alluded to, on the other hand this meta-analysis claims to empirically find η ≈ 1.5 for the UK and suggests current official UK govt guidance (η = 1) needs updating
Does economic growth make countries happier? Yes if most people benefit. The Easterlin paradox is a non-paradox once we look at the underlying data, or so OWID claims: in Japan the apparent paradox is due to survey questions changing over time, and in the US it's due to growth not benefiting most people. (I'm probably biased as someone from a country that's experienced plenty of growth in the last few decades)
People being happier in urban areas in developing countries and happier in rural areas in highly developed ones (those 2 outlier exceptions are Kuwait and the UAE):
Mo, I love this! I can't wait to hear what you think of what I come out with. I think I will steal some of these points (and acknowledge you).
Re if not growth: Regarding freedom, the weird(ish) thing is it's about perceptions of freedom. When you look at objective indicators for democracy it seems really null which I find very puzzling. I think I will dedicate some time to the hypothesis that we may not need to Swedenify but Latinify the world because it is just so striking and obvious that the LATAM countries clearly have a different intercept in the GDP <> LS relationship. The rural-urban thing is interesting. I assume that's mostly just a proxy for income in developing countries? I had urbanization as a predictor for trying to predict the wellbeing of the world throughout history but it seems colinear with GDP per capita. Altruism is interesting -- the animal welfare correlation is pretty striking -- what paper is this from? I wonder how much of altruism loads onto religiosity / a strong civic life? If I had to predict another big important factor for wellbeing that's the most orthogonal to GDP per capita it'd be something something a vibrant society and culture which I have no idea how to operationalize or optimize.
In this chapter, urban-rural differences in well-being were shown to be strongly dependent on development level, and as Figure 4.1 suggests the urbanisation experience in the more developed Western world can lead to lower rather than higher average levels of well-being in cities. In contrast to other parts of the world, in many countries in Northern and Western Europe, Northern America, and Australia-New Zealand, the relatively much smaller rural populations have higher average levels of well-being than urban populations. This can partly be explained by the fact that despite the larger urban areas having higher proportions of tertiary educated residents the tertiary educated are still in the minority. By comparison, the much larger less-educated majority face higher costs of living in cities relative to income, include a larger proportion of singles on low incomes (many of whom are students), and for a variety of reasons including reduced access to owner occupied housing and longer average commutes, experience return lower levels of well-being. The results are consistent with what we already know about the urban paradox, but local variations in such patterns warrant further research.
In this regard, our research has also shown that some groups are better able to reap the advantages of cities and are less exposed to the negative effects of cities than others. People with lower levels of education and/or lower income have fewer means of buying their way out of a poorer urban environment. In this research, we found that the urban happiness advantage is considerably larger for higher educated people than for lower educated people, both in Sub-Saharan Africa and Northern and Western Europe, Northern America, and Australia-New Zealand. Future research should in this regard examine more specifically which kind of living environment is best for which kind of people, specifically turning attention to lifestyles. Of particular importance in the Western world are the higher real housing costs the lower educated face in cities, resulting in longer commutes, which lowers time for leisure and time with family, coupled with compounding relative income effects in highly proximate environments. These are disadvantages generated from within the large conurbation rather than the result of selective in-migration from a relatively tiny rural population base.
The altruism <> animal welfare thing is from this paper.
"Something something a vibrant society and culture" funnily enough immediately made me think "LatAm", so yeah I'm very keen to see an exploration of the hypothesis that we should Latinify the world!
it seems like cash transfers that improve annual income by 10-30% in the USA have pretty much no effect on wellbeing. Weird. Not sure why yet.
I don't think it's that weird with the above values of η, considering that even in low income countries the effects of cash are significant but not immense, see this previous thread
Perhaps I should have said "semi-conventional within EA". GiveWell and FP, in their moral weights treat 1 doubling = 1 doubling regardless of the baseline income. Presumably AIM follows them? However, GiveWell (and probably FP) adopt a very strong wealth effect of η = 1.59 for their time discount. So they aren't necessarily consistent about how they use it. They are also aware of this.
It also seems pretty conventional, although much more implicit, in the wellbeing space, as the log-income cross national wellbeing gradient looks very linear (implying each doubling has the same effect).
Amongst economics, I assume "convention" is more about median than average? Drupp et. al (2018) surveyed views from over 200 discounting experts. For η, they gave a mean of 1.35 and a median of exactly 1.
I don't think it's that weird with the above values of η, considering that even in low income countries the effects of cash are significant but not immense, see this previous thread
Well yeah one implication is maybe should move towards consistently using a higher η? This would be a moderately sized deal. I'm going to partially frame the effects in terms of what's compatible with different values of η if we're assuming consistency between cash transfer experiments in LMICS and HICs.
I know there’s a lot been said about inequality as a driver of wellbeing—but a thing that’s a bit less well understood is inequality on what scale? It’s plausible that inequality isn’t viewed on a country level (the usual case), but maybe within regions, classes of people, or internationally.
Hm! Yeah I'm planning to look at inequality which objectively, doesn't seem to matter much on a within country basis. I haven't thought about cross country comparisons because I guess I don't expect people to spend much time thinking about those comparisons unless maybe you're WEIRD. One funny, but in retrospective obvious things is that the literature seems to find that a subjective sense of inequality or being treated unfairly seems to be strongly predictive (in contrast to frequent nulls for objective stuff). Now, this also is much messier because you need to have some view of the generative process of those views to know what to think of it. Sadder people probably think the "world is rigged against me". But it also seems quite plausible that people are picking up a fuzzier factors that are harder to capture like media or culture.
A recent SSC blog post depicts a dialogue about Eugenics. This raised the question: how has the track record been for a community of reasonable people to identify the risks of previous catastrophes?
As noted in the post, at different times:
Many people were concerned about overpopulation posing an existential threat (c.f. population bomb, discussed at length in Wizard and The Prophet). It now seems widely accepted that the risk overpopulation posed was overblown. But this depends on how contingent the green revolution was. If there wasn’t a Norman Borlaug, would someone else have tried a little bit harder than others to find more productive cultivars of wheat?
Historically, there also appeared to be more worry about the perceived threat posed by a potential decline in population IQ. This flowed from the reasonable-sounding argument “Smart people seem to have fewer kids than their less intellectually endowed peers. Extrapolate this over many generations, and we have an idiocracy that at best will be marooned on earth or at worst will no longer be capable of complex civilization.” I don’t hear these concerns much these days (an exception being a recent Clearer Thinking podcast episode). I assume the dismissal would sound something like “A. Flynn effect.[1] B. If this exists, it will take a long time to bite into technological progress. And by the time it does pose a threat, we should have more elegant ways of increasing IQ than selective breeding. Or C. Technological progress may depend more on total population size than average IQ since we need a few Von Neumann’s instead of hordes of B-grade thinkers.”
I think many EAs would characterize global warming as tentatively in the same class: “We weren’t worried enough when action would have been high leverage, but now we’re relatively too worried because we seem to be making good progress (see the decline in solar cost), and we should predict this progress to continue.”
There have also been concerns about the catastrophic consequences of: A. Depletion of key resources such as water, fertilizer, oil, etc. B. Ecological collapse. C. Nanotechnology(???). These concerns are also considered overblown in the EA community relative to the preoccupation with AI and engineered pathogens.
Would communism's prediction about an inevitable collapse of capitalism count? I don't know harmful this would have been considered in the short run since most attention was about the utopia this would afford.
Most of the examples I’ve come up with seem to make me lean towards the view that “these past fears were overblown because they consistently discount the likelihood that someone will fix the problem in ways we can't yet imagine.”
But I’d be curious to know if someone has examples or interpretations that lean more towards "We were right to worry! And in hindsight, these issues received about the right amount of resources. Heck they should have got more!"
What would an ideal EA have done if teleported back in time and mindwiped of foresight when these issues were discovered? If reasonable people acted in folly then, and EAs would have acted in folly as well, what does that mean for our priors?
I can't find an OWID page on this, despite google image searches making it apparent it once existed. Might not have fed the right conversations to have allowed people to compare IQs across countries?
Good point, but I think people worried about extinction risk from nuclear war before a really plausible mechanism-nuclear winter-was found by which that would occur following a US-Soviet exchange. There's a nuclear doomsday device in Dr. Strangelove, a novel about post-nuclear war human extinction from the 50s etc.: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Beach_(novel) Though to be fair, these are fiction, and it's not clear the idea was without foundation pre-nuclear winter research: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobalt_bomb https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_device
Wild Idea #4 Simultaneously Solve American Education, Politics and Maybe Housing
2050: It’s been twenty years since ground broke on Franklin University, nestled in the foothills of Medicine Bow National Forest. Cal Newport was right, skilled researchers and professors flocked to the promise of 70%+ research time. The recent national spotlight on several successful alumni caused a surge of interest in the school. Enrollment swelled. The school was beginning to turn a profit and wean itself off those tech millions.
Its students aren’t that different from those attending good state schools, and the school doesn’t improve them all that much. Only 5% of each class goes into direct EA work (much higher for those who get a degree in Global Priorities Studies or Wellbeing Decision Science). The average student would look much the same if they’d gone elsewhere, but they’re slightly more sensible and expansive in their mindset.
The research is where the university really shines. Professors get plenty of time to do research, as long as 40% of it is spent on the department’s high impact research agenda. They can spend the rest of their time exploring an esoteric and in expectation un-impactful area of knowledge, but the university probably won’t fund them to do it.
The accompanying city of Longwell was planned with sane ideas about zoning and transportation. The relatively infertile land and embrace of building made it one of the only cities with genuinely cheap housing in a place worth living. Miles of hiking and biking trails sprawl out of the city and stretch into the surrounding hills and woodlands. The promise of cheap housing tempts many remote workers to the charmingly walkable city. Many remark that the town feels “old”, comparing it favorably to cozy north-eastern or European towns. The same appeal keeps a share of graduates hanging around, starting companies.
The schools commitment to idealogical diversity somewhat appeases conservatives who sometimes point approvingly to the Universities’ distinct lack of wokeness. Since the beginning, many of the Institutes founders stress the non-partisan aspects of their shared research agenda. Despite the firm and careful guidance, the project draws the ire of pundits warning of a liberal plot to take over Wyoming and steal its securely Republican electoral and congressional votes.
The success of Frank-U and Longwell spawn imitators across the country.
2090: Longwell and its suburbs, long the fastest growing MSA in the United States, is now large enough to be a political force in the state. For the first time, both Senators from Wyoming come from a liberal democratic political party. Sitting near the center, they exert disproportional political force. It still rides goodwill after several technologies stemming from projects related to the city blunted a potentially catastrophic pandemic in 2084.
——----------
Note, that Montana, the second smallest red state with a population of 1 mil instead of ~500k voted 40% for Biden compared to 25% in woyming. This led to an absolute vote gap that was smaller, 100k instead of 120k.
Under a (somewhat) plausible theory of wellbeing, you may want to consider the deep terrestrial potential of improving the lives of the dead.
To explain requires some exposition. The two most prominent theories of wellbeing are hedonism and satisfactionism. The first claims that life is best for you when you feel best, and the second claims that life goes best when you satisfy your desires.
Satisfactionist or desire theories of wellbeing cleave into two further camps. One in which it's important you feel that you satisfy your desires. The other is "objective", where what is morally relevant is not that you think you're getting what you want, but that you actually get what you want. Note that the first type of satisfactionist would hop into the experience machine with the hedonists. Also, in the second theory, if your partner cheats on you for years and you never found out, it would consider that your life is worse -- which many people find intuitive.
I think Parfit had a thought experiment regarding Actual Satisfactionist theories where a man burns his whole life with a profound desire that there is life on another planet. He lives. Earth is alone. He dies. The next day, scientists discover life on mars! It was there the whole time. He never felt his desire satisfied, but it was, and his life was better for it.
This strikes some readers as strange. However, for those willing to bite this bullet, I offer you more. Imagine the "Life on Mars" case. Except, this version has a twist. Life wasn't there the whole time. Mars was dead. However, the year after he dies Elon rockets to the red planet with a whole terrarium full of critters and founds a permanent colony.
Is the man's life better off for having his desire fulfilled? If you think it's plausible that his life in fact improved, you can probably guess where I'm going with this...
The dead are many. We should look not towards bettering future lives, but past lives if the following is true: A. We care bout people's actual desires getting satisfied (and satisfying dying wishes counts), B. there are fewer people in the future than in the past and C. The dead carry coherent desires that we can satisfy.
Point B. is true if we believe Eliezer about AI and there's nothing we can do about it. And to offer a candidate to fulfill point C: Children. Every one of your ancestor's, and you had lots, I mean lots of them, by revealed preference wanted you to pass on their genes. Well now it's down to you.
So if you're into a weird variant of desire theories (can't stand them myself), you may want to reconsider that vasectomy.
I've started a living literature review on the relationship between wealth and wellbeing.
Things I've done some work on that I plan to publish more on that seem relevant to some EA conversations in global health and wellbeing :
Some less relevant things I'll work on: what does the causal evidence say about social media and mental wellbeing? -- it's somewhat bad, probably. How happy were our ancestors? -- Either about as happy as we are or, or as happy as people are in Afghanistan -- Which is to say teetering on the cusp of having negative wellbeing on average. Not sure which yet. Is it the psychology, stupid? I'm also curious to understand the psychology of populism, and if a non-material lens gives us a better sense of how to predict and maybe prevent populist driven destablization to the institutions we'll need to preserve to have any chance at governing during these wacky next few decades.
This is awesome, I've been meaning to sort out my confusions around this topic and expect your review to be very helpful for this.
Preregistering my reactions to see how I change my mind later:
The LatAm secret sauce:
Households of size 4:
People being happier in urban areas in developing countries and happier in rural areas in highly developed ones (those 2 outlier exceptions are Kuwait and the UAE):
Altruism:
Mo, I love this! I can't wait to hear what you think of what I come out with. I think I will steal some of these points (and acknowledge you).
Re if not growth: Regarding freedom, the weird(ish) thing is it's about perceptions of freedom. When you look at objective indicators for democracy it seems really null which I find very puzzling. I think I will dedicate some time to the hypothesis that we may not need to Swedenify but Latinify the world because it is just so striking and obvious that the LATAM countries clearly have a different intercept in the GDP <> LS relationship. The rural-urban thing is interesting. I assume that's mostly just a proxy for income in developing countries? I had urbanization as a predictor for trying to predict the wellbeing of the world throughout history but it seems colinear with GDP per capita. Altruism is interesting -- the animal welfare correlation is pretty striking -- what paper is this from? I wonder how much of altruism loads onto religiosity / a strong civic life? If I had to predict another big important factor for wellbeing that's the most orthogonal to GDP per capita it'd be something something a vibrant society and culture which I have no idea how to operationalize or optimize.
Steal away! :)
On the rural-urban thing:
The altruism <> animal welfare thing is from this paper.
"Something something a vibrant society and culture" funnily enough immediately made me think "LatAm", so yeah I'm very keen to see an exploration of the hypothesis that we should Latinify the world!
I know much less about this than you do, but some quick thoughts:
Is that really the convention? I thought the convention was to assume https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoelastic_utility with a η between 1.2 and 1.5?
I don't think it's that weird with the above values of η, considering that even in low income countries the effects of cash are significant but not immense, see this previous thread
Perhaps I should have said "semi-conventional within EA". GiveWell and FP, in their moral weights treat 1 doubling = 1 doubling regardless of the baseline income. Presumably AIM follows them? However, GiveWell (and probably FP) adopt a very strong wealth effect of η = 1.59 for their time discount. So they aren't necessarily consistent about how they use it. They are also aware of this.
It also seems pretty conventional, although much more implicit, in the wellbeing space, as the log-income cross national wellbeing gradient looks very linear (implying each doubling has the same effect).
Amongst economics, I assume "convention" is more about median than average? Drupp et. al (2018) surveyed views from over 200 discounting experts. For η, they gave a mean of 1.35 and a median of exactly 1.
Well yeah one implication is maybe should move towards consistently using a higher η? This would be a moderately sized deal. I'm going to partially frame the effects in terms of what's compatible with different values of η if we're assuming consistency between cash transfer experiments in LMICS and HICs.
I know there’s a lot been said about inequality as a driver of wellbeing—but a thing that’s a bit less well understood is inequality on what scale? It’s plausible that inequality isn’t viewed on a country level (the usual case), but maybe within regions, classes of people, or internationally.
Hm! Yeah I'm planning to look at inequality which objectively, doesn't seem to matter much on a within country basis. I haven't thought about cross country comparisons because I guess I don't expect people to spend much time thinking about those comparisons unless maybe you're WEIRD. One funny, but in retrospective obvious things is that the literature seems to find that a subjective sense of inequality or being treated unfairly seems to be strongly predictive (in contrast to frequent nulls for objective stuff). Now, this also is much messier because you need to have some view of the generative process of those views to know what to think of it. Sadder people probably think the "world is rigged against me". But it also seems quite plausible that people are picking up a fuzzier factors that are harder to capture like media or culture.
What’s the track record of secular eschatology?
A recent SSC blog post depicts a dialogue about Eugenics. This raised the question: how has the track record been for a community of reasonable people to identify the risks of previous catastrophes?
As noted in the post, at different times:
Most of the examples I’ve come up with seem to make me lean towards the view that “these past fears were overblown because they consistently discount the likelihood that someone will fix the problem in ways we can't yet imagine.”
But I’d be curious to know if someone has examples or interpretations that lean more towards "We were right to worry! And in hindsight, these issues received about the right amount of resources. Heck they should have got more!"
What would an ideal EA have done if teleported back in time and mindwiped of foresight when these issues were discovered? If reasonable people acted in folly then, and EAs would have acted in folly as well, what does that mean for our priors?
I can't find an OWID page on this, despite google image searches making it apparent it once existed. Might not have fed the right conversations to have allowed people to compare IQs across countries?
Right to worry about nuclear war, based on information later revealed about the Cuban Missile Crisis and other near misses
Good point, but I think people worried about extinction risk from nuclear war before a really plausible mechanism-nuclear winter-was found by which that would occur following a US-Soviet exchange. There's a nuclear doomsday device in Dr. Strangelove, a novel about post-nuclear war human extinction from the 50s etc.: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Beach_(novel) Though to be fair, these are fiction, and it's not clear the idea was without foundation pre-nuclear winter research: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobalt_bomb
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_device
Unclear if Y2K was fixed or was never really a problem - this article suggests the latter. https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/Y2K-bug/#:~:text=Software and hardware companies raced,worked to address the problem.
Wild Idea #4 Simultaneously Solve American Education, Politics and Maybe Housing
2050: It’s been twenty years since ground broke on Franklin University, nestled in the foothills of Medicine Bow National Forest. Cal Newport was right, skilled researchers and professors flocked to the promise of 70%+ research time. The recent national spotlight on several successful alumni caused a surge of interest in the school. Enrollment swelled. The school was beginning to turn a profit and wean itself off those tech millions.
Its students aren’t that different from those attending good state schools, and the school doesn’t improve them all that much. Only 5% of each class goes into direct EA work (much higher for those who get a degree in Global Priorities Studies or Wellbeing Decision Science). The average student would look much the same if they’d gone elsewhere, but they’re slightly more sensible and expansive in their mindset.
The research is where the university really shines. Professors get plenty of time to do research, as long as 40% of it is spent on the department’s high impact research agenda. They can spend the rest of their time exploring an esoteric and in expectation un-impactful area of knowledge, but the university probably won’t fund them to do it.
The accompanying city of Longwell was planned with sane ideas about zoning and transportation. The relatively infertile land and embrace of building made it one of the only cities with genuinely cheap housing in a place worth living. Miles of hiking and biking trails sprawl out of the city and stretch into the surrounding hills and woodlands. The promise of cheap housing tempts many remote workers to the charmingly walkable city. Many remark that the town feels “old”, comparing it favorably to cozy north-eastern or European towns. The same appeal keeps a share of graduates hanging around, starting companies.
The schools commitment to idealogical diversity somewhat appeases conservatives who sometimes point approvingly to the Universities’ distinct lack of wokeness. Since the beginning, many of the Institutes founders stress the non-partisan aspects of their shared research agenda. Despite the firm and careful guidance, the project draws the ire of pundits warning of a liberal plot to take over Wyoming and steal its securely Republican electoral and congressional votes.
The success of Frank-U and Longwell spawn imitators across the country.
2090: Longwell and its suburbs, long the fastest growing MSA in the United States, is now large enough to be a political force in the state. For the first time, both Senators from Wyoming come from a liberal democratic political party. Sitting near the center, they exert disproportional political force. It still rides goodwill after several technologies stemming from projects related to the city blunted a potentially catastrophic pandemic in 2084.
——----------
Note, that Montana, the second smallest red state with a population of 1 mil instead of ~500k voted 40% for Biden compared to 25% in woyming. This led to an absolute vote gap that was smaller, 100k instead of 120k.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_presidential_election_in_Montana
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_presidential_election_in_Wyoming
What we owe the past
(note: I know this post of the same title exists, but I haven't read it)
Under a (somewhat) plausible theory of wellbeing, you may want to consider the deep terrestrial potential of improving the lives of the dead.
To explain requires some exposition. The two most prominent theories of wellbeing are hedonism and satisfactionism. The first claims that life is best for you when you feel best, and the second claims that life goes best when you satisfy your desires.
Satisfactionist or desire theories of wellbeing cleave into two further camps. One in which it's important you feel that you satisfy your desires. The other is "objective", where what is morally relevant is not that you think you're getting what you want, but that you actually get what you want. Note that the first type of satisfactionist would hop into the experience machine with the hedonists. Also, in the second theory, if your partner cheats on you for years and you never found out, it would consider that your life is worse -- which many people find intuitive.
I think Parfit had a thought experiment regarding Actual Satisfactionist theories where a man burns his whole life with a profound desire that there is life on another planet. He lives. Earth is alone. He dies. The next day, scientists discover life on mars! It was there the whole time. He never felt his desire satisfied, but it was, and his life was better for it.
This strikes some readers as strange. However, for those willing to bite this bullet, I offer you more. Imagine the "Life on Mars" case. Except, this version has a twist. Life wasn't there the whole time. Mars was dead. However, the year after he dies Elon rockets to the red planet with a whole terrarium full of critters and founds a permanent colony.
Is the man's life better off for having his desire fulfilled? If you think it's plausible that his life in fact improved, you can probably guess where I'm going with this...
The dead are many. We should look not towards bettering future lives, but past lives if the following is true: A. We care bout people's actual desires getting satisfied (and satisfying dying wishes counts), B. there are fewer people in the future than in the past and C. The dead carry coherent desires that we can satisfy.
Point B. is true if we believe Eliezer about AI and there's nothing we can do about it. And to offer a candidate to fulfill point C: Children. Every one of your ancestor's, and you had lots, I mean lots of them, by revealed preference wanted you to pass on their genes. Well now it's down to you.
So if you're into a weird variant of desire theories (can't stand them myself), you may want to reconsider that vasectomy.